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GOLD MINING IN SOUTHERN RHODESIA, 1919-1953
I. R. PHIMISTER*
‘At the end of 1939 gold mining employed more than three-quarters 
of the total number of Africans engaged in mining; at the end of 
1953 it employed under two-fifths, and the number it employed were 
only about a third of those in 1939. Output in 1939 was nearly 
800,000 fine ounces; in 1953 little more than 500,000 fine ounces.
Until 1946 gold was Southern Rhodesia’s principal export; in that 
year it was overtaken by tobacco and since 1952 the value of 
exports of gold has been less than of asbestos. The decisive factor 
causing this decline has been the static dollar price of gold in rela­
tion to rising costs of production’.'
After 1918, gold mining in Southern Rhodesia was characterized by an 
overall decline in output. This trend was somewhat obscured and delayed by 
the premium on gold which operated between 1919 and 1925 and even tem­
porarily reversed in the years 1932 to 1940 following Britain’s abandonment 
of the gold standard, but by 1953 the amount of gold produced was smaller 
than in 1906. In the following pages, the reasons for the general fall in gold 
output, together with attempted remedies undertaken by both mineowners 
and Government, are examined.
Stagnation and decline of gold mining, 1919-1930
The structural change which occurred in the gold mining industry after 
19182 was notable for two main features; the growing importance of large 
producers and the near-eclipse of medium-sized mines. These latter mines, as 
Table I shows, declined considerably; from a total of ninety three in 1917, 
their number fell to fifty eight within two years. An increase in the price of 
gold temporarily halted this feature, but as the value of the premium de­
clined and then ended in early 1925, the eclipse of medium-sized producers 
accelerated.
* Lecturer in History, University of Rhodesia.
>C. H. Thompson and H. W. Woodruff, Economic Development in Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland (London, 1953), 153-4.
zFor the causes of this change, see Phimister, ‘History of Mining in Southern Rho­
desia to 1953’, University of Rhodesia, unpub. PhD, 1975, 122-3.
21
toto




BIG MINES MEDIUM MINES SMALL MINES
No. ozs. %  of 
total 
prod.
No. ozs. % of 
total 
prod.
No. ozs. % of 
total 
prod.
1913 689,954 14 388,544 56.31 80 230,896 33.47 394 70,514 10.22
1914 854,480 19 503,984 58.98 93 281,530 32.95 384 68.966 8.07
1915 915,029 17 562,928 61.52 91 272,479 29.78 381 79,622 8.70
1916 930,356 17 568,139 61.07 98 290,422 31.21 379 71,795 7.72
1917 834,230 14 511,685 61.34 93 247,836 30.90 359 64,709 7.76
1918 631,358 10 401,563 63.60 66 176,987 28.04 338 52,808 8.36
1919 593,222 10 402,466 67,84 58 143,045 24.11 246 47,711 8.05
1920 552,498 8 355,806 64.40 57 147,543 26.71 230 49,149 8.89
1921 585,525 9 381,614 65,18 59 160,521 27.41 248 43,390 7.41
1922 652,791 9 427,095 65.43 60 162,987 24.96 344 62,709 9.61
1923 647,491 9 431,488 66.64 67 147,988 22.85 390 68,015 10.51
1924 627,729 10 424,104 67.56 59 132,225 21.07 419 71,400 11.37
1925 581,504 8 394,786 67.89 45 111,534 19.18 428 75,184 12.93
1926 593,429 9 423,306 71.33 43 95,199 17.02 431 74,924 12.65
1927 581,438 9 438,967 75.50 39 84,461 14.52 326 58,010 9.98
1928 576,112 9 445,367 77,31 33 80,733 14.01 258 50,012 8.68
1929 560,813 9 412,744 73.59 32 96,103 17.15 249 51,966 9.26
1930 547,630 9 408,797 74.65 36 84,896 15.50 286 53,937 9.85
3S. Brooke-Norris, ‘The gold output and Mining activity of Southern Rhodesia, 1907 to 1932’, Southern Rhodesia Geological Survey Bulle­
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Smallworkers, too, fluctuated in numbers and output between 1919 and 
1930. But while this sector experienced a general decrease in production and 
in the number of producers, it was nowhere near as great as in the medium 
sector. The percentage contribution of smallworkers to the total gold output 
remained roughly constant, in contrast to that of medium-sized producers 
which was halved between 1917 and 1930.
Although the number of large mines also decreased towards the end 
of World War One, their later consistency, both in numbers and in output, 
was significant. Despite the fall in total gold production, ‘the contribution of 
the big mines stayed within a narrow range, never verying by more than 11 
per cent, from 400,000 ozs. p.a. and was 7,000 ozs. more in 1930 than it 
was in 1918’.4 Their steady output in the years under discussion, when pro­
duction by smaller mines was declining, served to enhance the dominant 
position of large producers within the industry. By 1930, nine large mines 
accounted for over seventy four per cent of all gold mined.
Explanation for this structural change is found in the particular profit­
ability constraints which affected each of the three main components of the 
gold mining industry. All three, of course, shared the basic cost structure 
associated with the mining of low grade ore and the consequent imperatives 
of cost minimisation and output maximisation.5 But the capacity of different­
sized mines to absorb or reduce costs or pursue flexible mining policies with 
regard to the price of gold, differed sharply. Smallworkers, for example, with 
their profitability dependent on a very low level of working costs, were es­
pecially vulnerable to rapid increases in the cost of mining materials. Not 
surprisingly, the number of small mines decreased by over one hundred 
between 1917 and 1919. Conversely, when the price of gold increased and 
the cost of mining stores dropped, the characteristic low capitalisation and 
easily transportable crushing mills employed by smallworkers enabled them 
to respond quickly to more favourable economic conditions.
By very definition, large mines enjoyed bigger capital resources, more 
advanced crushing and recovery plant, specialised management and engineer­
ing services and skills and, potentially at least, far greater ore reserves of 
varying value than did smaller producers. The use of comparatively large 
plants conferred the important benefit of reduction of working costs per unit.6 
Such economies of scale were also apparent in the ability of large mines to 
purchase bulk supplies of stores and food and to plan and order ahead for
■»N. H. Wilson, The Mining Industry of Southern Rhodesia (Salisbury, 1933), 18. 
s For fuller discussion, see Phimister, ‘The Reconstruction of the Southern Rhodesian 
Gold Mining Industry, 1903-10’, Economic History Review, 1976 (forthcoming). 
«W. J. Busschau, The Theory of Gold Supply with special reference to the problems 
of the Witwatersrand (London, 1936), 63.
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their requisites. Furthermore, actual or potential possession of large ore 
reserves allowed big mines to follow a more scientific policy of selective 
mining as regards the grade of ore sent to the crushing mill.7
Essentially, this meant that if the price of gold increased, large mines 
could choose to extract a section of ore whose grade had previously been 
unprofitable. Evidence that the ‘mines worked systematically and regulated 
their grade according to market price’8 is provided by Table II reproduced 
below.
TABLE II: EFFECT OF GOLD PRICE ON ORE GRADE, PART ONE
YEAR TOTAL OZS. GRADE AVERAGE PREMIUM
1919 593,222 6.70 17/- per. oz. July-Dee
1920 552,498 6.35 27/9 „ 99
1921 585,525 6.17 22/3 „ 99
1922 652,791 6,33 8/6 „ 99
1923 647,491 6,18 5/6 „ 99
1924 627,729 6.02 8/10 „ 99
1925 581,504 5.95 2/1 „ „ Jan-Mar
The disappearance of the premium after March 1925 resulted in a gradual 
rise in grade, as ore of a  lower value once again became unprofitable.
TABLED: PART TWO






But selective mining was effectively restricted to large mines because 
‘the determination of the most profitable grade of ore is a complex 
process, as the grade is a function of the capital outlay (i.e. the size 
of the technical equipment), the rate of interest, the degree of risk 
involved, the annual output, and the distribution of ore between 
high and low grades’.9
As the profitability of smallworkers’ operations depended on near- 
immediate returns, they were obliged to follow a policy of non-selective
7For explanation of ‘selective’ and ‘non-selective’ mining, see Busschau, 85-7. By grade 
is meant the number of dwts. of gold contained in a ton of rock.
eS 472, ‘Effect of Gold Price on Grade of Ore treated by the Large Mines’, Registrar 
of Claims to the Hon. the Minister of Mines, 4.xi.l939. The table is taken from this 
source. All archival sources are held in the National Archives of Rhodesia, Salisbury.
sBusschau, 86.
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mining whereby all payable gold was extracted. Similarly, medium-sized 
producers lacked the capitalisation and scale of operations to postpone 
immediate high returns by following a flexible grade policy. Unlike small- 
workers, though, their operations involved comparatively heavier fixed costs 
which did not allow them to stop and start production with relative impunity. 
It was thus the particular structural position of medium-sized mines which 
made them especially vulnerable to cost inflation.
Problems engendered by rising costs during and after World War One 
were in fact the major difficulties which the gold mining industry con­
fronted in the early part of this period. Considerable price increases of mining 
stores and machinery were occasioned by the war, but the ‘cessation of 
hostilities brought little relief to the mining industry, as the prices for 
mining requisites, instead of falling, still showed an upward tendency’.'0 
Mining spares and machinery such as boilers and engines went up in price by 
about ten per cent during 1920, although in certain districts the closure of 
mines allowed a reduction in the cost of second-hand crushing mills." The 
persistence and, in some cases, additional increase to these high prices 
caused a further fall in the number of mines in all sectors of the gold mining 
industry, but particularly among medium and small producers. As regards 
the latter mines, it was reported that they have ‘had a hard time to make 
both ends meet. Many have retired from the contest altogether and the 
remainder, except those who are in the fortunate position of having high 
grade ore bodies are struggling along in a hand to mouth fashion’.12
By 1921, the crest of cost inflation for manufactured mining articles 
had been reached and prices gradually began to fall. Even so, working costs 
for smallworkers at this time were estimated at between twenty and fifty 
per cent above pre-war figures,'3 especially as two important exceptions to 
falling prices were explosives and cyanide.14 It was only in the following 
year when the cost of mining commodities was appreciably reduced that 
smallworkers began to reappear in increasing numbers. ‘The fall in the 
price of machinery, both new and second-hand’, explained the acting Secretary 
for Mines, ‘has assisted the small men to purchase plant and start working 
operations, whilst at the same time developing’.'5
Apart from price increases for manufactured commodities, the gold 
mines also had to contend with a rise in the cost of coal and in transport 
rates. Following a strike of white employees towards the end of 1919,
ioReport of the Secretary for Mines for the year 1919, 1.
"A 8/1/10, Mining Commissioner, Hartley, report for year ended 31 .xii. 1920. 
izlbid, Mining Commissioner, Bulawayo, report for year ended 31 .xii. 1920. 
isibid. Mining Commissioner, Salisbury, Mazoe and Lomagundi, report for year ending 
31 .xii. 1921.
i*Report of the Secretary for Mines for the year 1921, 2.
'^Report of the Acting Secretary for Mines for the year 1922, 1.
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Wankie Colliery had been forced to increase their wages. These increased 
production costs were passed directly to consumers, as the colliery in turn 
raised the price of coal at the pithead from ten shillings per ton to twelve 
shillings.16 The cost of coal to the mines was greater than this figure suggests, 
because of the higher railway rates introduced in 1919.17 Consequently, 
by 1923 the Salisbury Chamber of Mines was complaining of the ‘enormous 
increase in one of the principal necessaries of mining’ and warned that the 
‘high cost of coal and the heavy transportation charge on it have forced 
mining companies to consider the use of gas engines with wood-burning 
producers’.16 The important Lonely Mine, for example, did just that. When 
supplies of nearby wood fuel were exhausted, instead of turning to coal, 
the mine installed a gas suction plant which reduced working costs signific­
antly.19 But the capital cost of such plant, some seventy five thousand 
pounds,20 meant that this option was open only to large mines.
As with coal, one of the reasons for the introduction of higher railway 
rates in 1919 was the increased wages paid to white railwaymen, but more 
important were ‘expenses in connection with the provision of fresh capital’. 
To service this debt a special surcharge on all rates was imposed early in 
1920 and at the end of the year was further raised to 33^ per cent.21 In
1922 the surcharge was removed on bulk items like chrome, asbestos, copper 
and coke,22 but otherwise continued unaltered except for minor reductions in
1923 and early 1925. The latter concession was dismissed by the mining 
industry as ‘totally inadequate’.23 Railway rates were, however, substantially 
cut in 1926, possibly because the railway administration was aware that the 
gold mines were now working without the help of the gold premium. Rates 
on mining machinery, cyanide and heavy iron and steel goods were reduced 
by ten per cent and by between ten and thirteen per cent on coal.24
A further increased cost which the gold mines had to bear concerned 
labourers’ rations. World War One had brought about a boom in external 
demand for Southern Rhodesian maize and cattle and this lasted through 
1920. Although the price increase was only of short duration, it coincided 
with cost inflation for mining stores and was undoubtedly instrumental in 
forcing the closure of numerous medium and small mines. Large mines, 
though, were able to minimize this increase by a system of forward contracts:
'6Report of the Secretary for Mines for the year 1919, 7.
'7Rhodesia Chamber of Mines Annual Report for the year 1920, 28.
is Rhodesia Herald, 6.vi.l923.
isL 2/1/137, A. Treger, Lonely Mine, to S. S. Grossberg, 25.X.1921.
2°A 8/1/10, Mining Commissioner, Bulawayo, report for year ended 31 .xii. 1921.
^'Rhodesia Chamber of Mines Annual Report for the year 1920, 28; Ibid, 1922, 29.
zzlbid.
23Report of the Under Secretary for Mines and Works for the year 1923, 3; Rhodesia 
Chamber of Mines Annual Report for the year 1925, 30.
2 4 Rhodesia Chamber of Mines Annual Report for the year 1926, 26-7.
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‘The bigger mines are more fortunate with regard to prices than the 
Small Worker. For instance, the big mines have been able to get 
meal at the contract price of 10/- per bag, whereas the small mines 
have had in some cases to pay as much as 26/- for the meal they 
required’.25
While all sectors of the gold mining industry were affected by cost 
inflation in the various spheres described above, there was little direct action 
that could be taken to minimize such costs. No control could be exercised 
over the prices of imported commodities and even as regards railway rates, 
the gold mines could do little more than agitate for their reduction. Direct 
cost minimisation, as before in the period of reconstruction from 1903-10, 
was thus concentrated against labour. But unlike the earlier period, the most 
spectacular conflict and wage reductions involved white mineworkers.
The structural position of the large mines normally ensured that they 
were better placed to absorb or minimize the impact of increased costs, 
but in this instance the comparative cost benefits which their size conferred 
in other spheres were reversed. As the largest employers of white workers, they 
bore the brunt of such wage demands. Between 1914 and 1920 the cost of 
living for whites rose by fifty nine per cent26 and white workers both on 
the mines and elsewhere responded with a series of wage demands and 
strikes. Faced with a declining output and general cost inflation the question 
of white wages consequently assumed an increasing urgency for large gold 
producers in the years immediately after World War One. On the Gaika 
Mine, for example, it was reported that the
‘increase in pay given to European employees in January represented 
an increase of approximately 2/- per ton . . . the continual increase 
in costs due to the increase in cost of stores and railage, and the 
further demands for higher wages recently presented by the Mine 
Workers’ Union are a source of great anxiety to the Management’.27
Other spokesmen, too, had earlier claimed that because the gold mines ‘were 
at present just on the balance between profit and loss’, they could not afford 
increased white wages.28
These claims, however, contained a strong element of managerial ideo­
logy and did not strictly reflect the economic viability of the large gold mines. 
Throughout the early part of this period dividends continued to be realised
25A 8/1/10, Mining Commissioner, Salisbury, Mazoe, Lomagundi, report for year 
ending 31.xii.1919.
*sT 8/2/2, P.D.L. Fynn, to Secretary, 18.ii. 1920.
Z7A 8/1/10, Mining Commissioner, Gwelo, report for the year ended 31 .xii. 1920.
ttRhodesia Chamber of Mines Annual Report for the year 1919, 34.
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at a rate of half a million or more pounds per annum;29 what was at stake 
was not so much the fundamental profitability of the industry, but profit 
maximisation. Associated with this imperative was the need to attract fresh 
capital which, allegedly, was being deterred from entering the country by 
labour unrest and increased production costs.30 In 1921, the President of the 
Rhodesia Chamber of Mines sarcastically observed that ‘it was very difficult 
to get Labour to understand the true economic position’, but he did ‘think 
the bulk of the employees understood that if a mine did not pay its way it 
could not carry on’. But this was not enough; not only had a mine to pay 
its way, it also had to pay enough for dividends ‘so as to satisfy the people 
with the money in the various concerns. Their object was to attract capital 
to the country, and not to get rid of it’.31
For these reasons32 the Rhodesia Mine Owners Association, formed in 
1920 to co-ordinate the policy of large mines, took action against white 
workers. Following a strike at Shamva in 1921, a general lock-out was 
organised by the mine owners and this ended in capitulation by white 
workers. In 1922 white wages were reduced and in subsequent years union 
organisation was broken by the mining companies. So successful were the 
mining companies that unionism was not re-established amongst white 
mineworkers until 1938.
But if conflict between the gold mines and their white workers over 
wages was primarily an issue of profit maximisation, the fundamental profit­
ability of the industry continued to rest on the exploitation of cheap, black 
labour. During much of World War One, black wages either remained static 
or declined,33 as the cost of other elements of production rose. Towards the 
end of the war, African wages rose slightly by an average of thirteen per cent, 
but at the same time their cost of living had advanced enormously. An in­
vestigation conducted by the Native Department revealed that, on the basis 
of ten types of articles most commonly bought by Africans, their c.o.l. had 
risen on average by one hundred and sixty five per cent between 1914 and
zsSee, for example, T 2/29/59/1 and Report of the Acting Secretary for Mines for the 
year 1922, 3. After 1923 and until 1929, dividends averaged well over three-quarters 
of a million pounds per annum; see Rhodesia Chamber of Mines Annual Report for 
the year 1923, and subsequent years. After that date, no composite figures for the 
industry’s dividends have been found; dividends of the Globe and Phoenix, Cam and 
Motor and Rezende mines for the period between 1930 and 1953 rise markedly 
during 1930-1938, and thereafter fall rapidly. In the case of the Cam and Motor, 
from an average of £300.000 per annum to circa £70,000 per annum. I am grateful 
to Mr. J. G. Phimister for supplying these figures.
3°Report of the Secretary for Mines for the year 1920, 1.
3iRhodesia Chamber of Mines Annual Report for the year 1921, 30.
32The premium on gold also declined after 1921.
33W. Margolis, ‘The position of the Native Population in the Economic Life of South­
ern Rhodesia’, University of South Africa, unpub. M. A. thesis, 1938, 146.
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November 1920.34 African real wages had thus fallen significantly and in fact 
were lower than in 1904.
Moreover, the average African wage increase was calculated on the 
basis of the mining industry as a whole and this obscured the fact that the 
major proportion of the increase came from base mineral properties then 
operating in boom conditions. The important gold mining districts of Gwelo, 
Hartley and Gatooma registered no wage increases at all35 and in numerous 
instances African cash wages were lower than in 1914. In the Hartley and 
Gatooma districts, African mineworkers in 1920 were ‘actually being paid 
some 4/- per head less than their pre-War rates of pay’. The assessment of 
the local mining commissioner was that the
‘present position would therefore appear to be that although the 
Mines have to pay high prices for Mining Stores, spares of certain 
Machinery, and . . . increased wages for the white employees, still 
on the other side Native Wages and the foods necessary for the 
feeding of these natives are appreciably lower’.36
Further inroads into African wages continued to be made and 1925 they 
were, at best, some twenty five per cent lower than in 1912.37
The gold mining industry also continued to utilise the skills of African 
mineworkers as far as possible. But as before, this feature was most pre­
dominant amongst the smaller producers where it received a fillip due to 
other rising costs, particularly white wages, during and after World War One. 
A further factor was the shortage of skilled white labour occasioned by the 
war and this led to complaints that ‘many highly skilled native miners . . . 
have taken the places of those who have put their duty to their country 
first’,30 An investigation published in 1925 revealed a formidable list of 
occupations held by skilled Africans. On the mines these job categories 
included clerks, drillers, drill sharpeners, hoist attendants, latheworkers, mine 
engine drivers, typists, fitters, joiners, riggers, timbermen, carpenters, electri­
cians, motor mechanics, steam hammer attendants and millmen.39 Employ­
ment of Africans in these categories was mostly confined to medium and 
small producers whose structural cost limitations were highlighted by the 
often-expressed opinion that it would be economically ‘disastrous to . . .  small 
workers if any restriction were placed on the employment of skilled Native 
labour’.40
3 4N 3/33/2, Cost of Living, Native Commissioners’ Reports, 22.xi.1920.
3sN 3/33/2, attached schedules.
3®A 8/1/10, Mining Commissioner, Hartley-Gatooma, report for year ended 31 .xii.l 920. 
37S 235/396, ‘Cost of Administration Report: Rhodesian Native Labour Bureau’, 
20.iii.1925.
38DG 5/1/2, Civil Commissioner, Gatooma, report for year 1916.
39Report of the Commission appointed to enquire into the matter of Native Education 
in all its bearings in the Colony of Southern Rhodesia, 1925, 107-8.
■eoJbid, 106.
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The same investigation discovered that on ‘some mines, particularly the 
older ones, if actual displacement of the white has not occurred, at any rate 
some of the wastage of white labour has been made good by trained Native 
labour . . .  the result has been . . .  a reduction in the ratio of white labour 
to black’.41 This decline must again have occurred primarily outside of the 
large mines because on the Shamva and Globe and Phoenix gold mines, for 
example, the majority of the skilled occupations noted above were held by 
Europeans.42 Nevertheless, even on large gold mines the ratio of white to 
black was much lower in Southern Rhodesia than on the Rand; in 1925 
the ratio on the Rand was approximately 1:9, whereas in Southern Rhodesia 
it varied from 1:15 to 1:24.
Between 1919 and 1925, the cost problems encountered by the gold 
mining industry had to a certain degree been eased by the operation of a 
premium on gold. First introduced at the end of July 1919,43 the value of 
the premium was subject to considerable fluctuations and after 1921 declined 
more or less steadily, before being phased out early in 1925. Although the 
premium slowed and even briefly reversed the general fall in the output of 
gold, it operated, as previously argued, mainly to the advantage of large 
gold mines and with its disappearance the decline of the more vulnerable 
medium and small producers was renewed.
The contraction of gold production had earlier attracted the attention of 
the Government and in 1924 a scheme to assist the mining industry had 
been inaugurated. Over a four-year period, sixty thousand pounds was voted 
to help prospectors, aid miners purchase machinery and develop their pro­
perties and to assist the industry generally. Some of this capital was chan­
nelled into base mineral propositions, especially mica mining, but for the 
gold mining industry as a whole the impact of the scheme was negligible.44 
Assisted individual prospecting in particular was singularly unsuccessful and 
as some of those associated with the industry realised, large-scale, modem 
methods were called for. Initiatives in this field, however, were successfully 
blocked by smallworkers.
The inability of the gold mining industry as a whole to maximise out­
put and further reduce costs after 1925 rested on a variety of features which 
limited Government assistance could not overcome. One general problem 
was that as mines were worked deeper in the 1920s the cost per ounce tended 
to rise either through a falling-off in the value of the deposit with depth (a 
common characteristic of Southern Rhodesia gold mining) or ‘an increase
4'Ibid, 109.
-^Information contained in The Rhodesia Directory 1927 (Bulawayo, 1927).
43Report of the Secretary for Mines for the year 1919, 1.
ttReport of the Secretary, Department of Mines and Public Works on Mines, for the 
year 1928, 2-4.
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in the cost of extraction with richness unchanged, since mining at great 
depth would entail high ventilation and other charges’. Busschau goes on 
to explain that the law of diminishing returns, under which all mines operate, 
states that
‘if at a particular time and with given methods of production (pro­
cesses, types of machinery, etc.), the same application of capital 
and labour applied in successive doses to a piece of land gives with 
additional doses decreasing marginal returns (although the return 
in total may be increased) production is taking place under condi­
tions of diminishing returns or increasing costs’.43
This problem was rendered especially acute for the mines when gold returned 
to a fixed price after March 1925.
Escape from this dilemma in such circumstances could only lie along 
the paths of output maximisation and cost minimisation. What is significant 
is that the industry was forced to adopt the less satisfactory policy of output 
maximisation in the sense of aiming for the highest possible extraction of 
gold per ton. The tonnage milled each year declined steadily, while the grade 
of ore that could be profitablly mined rose considerably. As earlier dis­
cussed, however, only the large mines could effectively exercise this option, 
which even for them could be no more than a short-term holding operation.
Recourse to the customary proceedure of minimising costs by reducing 
expenditure on African labour was not generally possible after the end of 
the gold premium and before the Depression for a number of reasons. The 
slump in maize and cattle prices during 1921-3 obliged increasing numbers 
of indigenous Southern Rhodesian Africans to seek wage employment and 
this, together with expanding numbers drawn from the peripheries of the 
regional economic system, ensured the mining industry of an adequate 
labour supply even when wages were falling. But from the latter part of 
1925 through until 1928 a labour shortage of varying intensity persisted.4® 
This was partly due to a temporary recovery in the economic position of 
part of the Southern Rhodesian African peasantry between 1924 and 1929 
and to the assistance given African cash-cropping in Nyasaland in this 
period.47 In 1928 and 1929 leading spokesmen for the industry raised the 
question, for the first time since the turn of the century, of introducing labour-
asBusschau, 36.
**Rhodesia Chamber of Mines Annual Report for the year 1925 and see reports for 
succeeding years. In the context of the Southern Rhodesian mining industry, ‘labour 
shortage’ is a relative term; i.e. relative to a non-adjustable wage level, at least in 
an upward direction.
•«7See M. Chanock, ‘The Political Economy of Independent Agriculture in Colonial 
Malawi: The Great War to the Great Depression’, Journal of Social Science, 1972, 
1, 113-29.
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saving machinery to the mines and also drew attention to the danger posed to 
Southern Rhodesia’s labour supplies by the development of the Northern 
Rhodesian Copperbelt.48
Other factors which contributed to the shortage of labour at this time 
included the rapid expansion of the territory’s labour-intensive commercial 
farming49 and competition from the expanding base mineral mines. These 
latter producers, together with the small gold mines, in fact generally found 
it difficult to obtain sufficient labour because of the lower wages they paid. 
The somewhat higher wages on the large gold mines normally allowed them 
to meet their labour requirements but the managements of the companies 
concerned must have realised that for the moment black wage labour costs 
could not be arbitrarily reduced. Warning of this was served by at least ten 
strikes on various mines, including that on the large Shamva Mine, between 
December 1925 and October 1928. It would seem that all the industry could 
do at this point was ensure that wages generally did not rise. Cost minimisa­
tion in this vital sector was thus arrested and production declined accordingly, 
until by 1930 the amount of gold produced was smaller than in 1907.
Recovery and contraction of gold mining, 1931-1953
A number of features associated with the Great Depression enabled 
Southern Rhodesia’s gold mining industry to expand greatly after 1931. 
Most significant of these was Britain’s abandonment of the gold standard 
in September 1931 and Southern Rhodesia’s decision to follow suit the 
same October. The resultant rise in the price of gold made profitable millions 
of tons of previously unpayable ore. Also vitally important was the impact 
of the Depression on agricultural and base mineral activities, whose markets 
either collapsed or at best were severely reduced in size. Labourers formerly 
employed in those sectors, together with many peasants from the African 
rural areas, were thus obliged to seek work on the gold mines. With the 
increased value of gold and abundant labour, the obstacles which had earlier 
blocked output maximisation and cost minimisation disappeared. Between 
1931 and 1938, the output of gold rose from 532,111 ounces to 814,078 
ounces, an increase of fifty three per cent. At the same time, the grade of 
ore mined fell by over fifty per cent, from 7.65 dwts. to 3.72 dwts.5°
*&Rhodesia Herald, 15.vi.1928; Rhodesia Chamber of Mines Annual Report for the 
year 1929, 30. From the 1930s onwards, many of the problems concerning labour 
supplies and capital for the Southern Rhodesia mining industry can be seen as result­
ing from its position in the regional economic system between the two immensely 
rich poles of the Copperbelt and the Rand.
^Competition from this source was alleviated after the collapse of the tobacco boom 
in 1928.
=°S 472.
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The number of mines also rose rapidly, from 499 in 1931 to 1,634 in 
1934. Virtually all the new producers were smallworkers and of their number, 
some ninety per cent produced less than five hundred ounces of gold per 
annum.51 Nevertheless, the percentage contribution of small mines to the 
total gold output climbed to between twenty five and thirty per cent and the 
predominant position earlier held by the large gold mines deteriorated con­
siderably. By 1936, their share of the total gold mined had fallen to only 
thirty seven per cent.52
This structural shift in favour of smallworkers was both a cause and 
a consequence of changed Government policy towards the mining industry 
after 1931. New taxes mainly affected large producers and various forms of 
Government assistance were designed primarily to aid small mines. Inter­
action of these several aspects of Government policy and other factors pre­
vented the re-establishment of the gold mining industry on a secure basis in 
the years proceeding World War Two. The spectacular expansion of prewar 
years was superseded after 1941 by an equally swift collapse which under­
lined the industry’s basic profitability contraints.
Initially, though, the rise in the price of gold, on average some 32s. per 
ouncer higher than the old fixed price, was ‘of the utmost value and has 
enabled certain mines to continue working profitably, whereas at the price 
of standard gold they were barely making expenses’.53 Not only did established 
properties take on a new lease of life, but their ranks were also yearly 
augmented by hundreds of small producers. As early as 1932, the value 
of the ‘premium’ alone was £916,522 out of a total gold output worth 
£3,366,222s'’ and undoubtedly was of vital importance in regenerating the 
gold mining industry.
But signs of recovery had been apparent even before the Colony left 
the gold standard. An official publication noted that following the onset of 
the Depression,
‘already in 1930 men were turning back from base minerals to gold, 
as may be seen by the increase in gold claims registered . . . The 
number of the smallest class of mines rose, too, from 249 in 1929 
to 286 in 1930. This recrudescence of gold mining activity . . . 
was not much reflected in the output of the small mines, on account 
of the natural “lag” between increasing prospecting and increasing 
production’.55
si Rhodesian Manual (London and Johannesburg, 1935-6), 68-9. 
szS 472.
53Report of the Secretary, Department of Mines and Public Works, on Mines for the 
year 1931, 3.
5*Rhodesia Chamber of Mines Annual Report for the year 1932, 17. 
ssWilson, 20-1.
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Allied to renewed entrepreneurial interest in gold mining was the supply 
of labour released by depressed agricultural and especially base mineral 
producers. The number of Africans employed on gold mines rose from 
roughly twenty two thousand in 1930 to almost sixty thousand by June 
1934. This represented an increase of about 173 per cent, while in the same 
period the numbers engaged in asbestos mining decreased by 68.9 per cent, 
in chrome by 83.9 per cent and in coal by 56.9 per cent.36
Revelling in a situation of abundant black labour, the gold mines, parti­
cularly the increasing numbers of smallworkers, reduced African wages 
constantly after 1930. From an average monthly figure of 28s 2d. in 1930, 
wages fell yearly until by 1935 the average monthly pay for an African 
mineworker was 20s. Id. Even this figure is misleading high, as the larger 
mines
‘pay wages which are consistently higher by nearly 50 per cent than 
those paid by the smaller mines. Employment on the small mines 
has increased more rapidly than on the large and the decline from 
21,071 in 1935 to 18,108 in 1937 in the numbers of native labourers 
in the latter group was accompanied by an increase from 46,552 
to 52,809 respectively in native workers engaged on small mines. As 
a result of the greater relative importance of the small miner, the 
average wage paid in the industry was not much above that paid 
by the small mines’.
In 1935, for example, the average monthly wage paid on a small gold mine 
was only 17s. 10d.57
So marked and widespread were African wage reductions that they 
drew the attention of officials outside the mining industry. One Native Com­
missioner observed that ‘even on Gold Mines where a premium is being 
paid . . .  the pay of Natives is kept as low as possible. I have seen cases 
where Natives were employed in trolleying Quartz — the pay was 8/- for a 
30 day ticket, and this on a Mine which is producing profitably’.58 Elsewhere 
it was reported that there ‘has been considerable gambling in the mining 
industry at the expense of the native labourers. Plant and machinery is 
apparently easily obtained on credit, so that it is possible for a man with 
no capital to start mining, and if he does not succeed, the natives alone are 
the losers’.59 Not surprisingly, overseas commentators, too, were able to 
congratulate the Southern Rhodesian gold mines on enjoying ‘the cheapest 
black labour probably in the British Empire’.60
ssEconomic and Statistical Bulletin of Southern Rhodesia, II, 21.ix.1934, 2. 
57/fcirf, VI, 21.vii.1938, 2.
seS 235/526, NC, Victoria, report for October 1933.
59S 235/512, NC, Gwelo, report for year 1934. 
e°African World Annual, 1934, 173.
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Cost minimisation in the vital sphere of black labour was crucial for 
small mines despite the increased price of gold. There were several related 
reasons for this, apart from the fundamental constraints which operated 
during and after the reconstruction period.6' Most important, perhaps, was 
the fact that
‘a large number of existing producers have been imported into the 
industry through depression in other trades, without any experience 
in prospecting or in any branch of mining; it is not surprising to 
find that this class of producer is often found endeavouring to work 
propositions quite uneconomic under any condition, and often em­
ploying the crudest methods of mining’.62
Smallworkers’ operations frequently suffered from ‘breakdowns of machinery 
. . . due to neglect; unsuitable extraction methods; lack of sufficient ore 
reserves to keep the mills supplied; . . . and insufficiency of capital to stay 
the course till the production stage is reached, with its corollary of stopped 
credit’.63
Smallworkings were characteristically labour-intensive operations, and 
this feature was greatly aggravated when coupled with the entrepreneur’s 
inexperience and minimal capitalisation. Ignorance of efficient surface and 
underground organisation usually eliminated the possibility of cost minimisa- 
ton there, and reinforced the need for cheap, black labour. This imperative 
was rendered particularly acute by the associated wastage and inefficient 
utilisation of labour.64 For example, as late as 1938 it was calculated that 
on small mines efficiency rarely approached a figure of five:
‘By this figure is meant the all important figure of tons of ore per 
month to mill per native employee . . .  in practically every case 
the tonnage milled on small mines is over-estimated, and no exact 
methods of measurement exist. I do not believe that there is any 
small mine in this country . . . which has an overall efficiency ex­
ceeding five. The worst case . . . was nearly 300 natives employed 
for less than 500 tons milled’.65
Although smallworkers were responsible for a significant proportion of 
of Southern Rhodesia’s expanded gold output after 1931, this obviously 
rested on the flimsiest of foundations, especially as inefficiency was masked
e'See Phimister, ‘Reconstruction’.
62Report of the Secretary, Department of Mines and Public Works, on Mines for the 
year 1935, 2. See also, Report of Commission to enquire into the Preservation . . . 
of the Natural Resources of the Colony, 1939, 51.
saRhodesian Mining Journal, October 1933, 403.
6<S 235/517, Assistant NC, Que Que, report for year 1939.
tsSmallworker, October 1938. 23. Calculated on a rather different basis, the crushing 
stamp efficiency on the Rand in 1933 was, on average, roughly fifteen tons per stamp 
per twenty four hours, whereas for many small Southern Rhodesian mines it was 
merely from 0.4 to 1.9 tons per stamp; see Rhodesian Mining Journal, October 1933, 
403; ibid, April 1933, 155.
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and output achieved only through the exploitation of ultra-cheap African 
labour. The gold mining industry ‘has never been in a healthier condition 
than to-day and its prospects of further advancement have never been 
brighter’, claimed the Secretary for Mines in 1935, but the same report 
noted warnings that the industry ‘whilst appearing to flourish, is, in fact, 
in a precarious position, and has no foundations or base to withstand any 
adverse conditions . . . and . . .  a drop in the price of gold or an increase 
in working costs would result in at least a partial collapse of the industry.’66
To a considerable extent, however, many smallworkers were propped 
up by Government assistance. Such aid had existed in the previous decade 
but its volume grew considerably in the 1930s.67 Their rapidly increasing 
numbers and economic importance had assisted the capture by small­
workers of a dominant position in the governmental system of the mining 
sector after the general election of 1933. Political power was thereafter used 
in an attempt to consolidate and perpetuate the particular interests of small 
producers within the mining industry.
A wide range of Government services to the mining industry were in­
stituted or augmented, most notably the establishment of a state-financed 
Roasting Plant at Que Que for the treatment of refractory sulphide ores 
and the provision of regular, cheap power through the Electricity Supply 
Commission.68 Many small mines were thus able for the first time to under­
take the extraction of sulphide gold ore, while simultaneously electric power 
contributed to lower working costs.69
Mining operations by smallworkers were further facilitated through 
access to a Government Loan Fund and the fact that the great majority of 
small mines were exempt from fresh mining taxation.70 As regards the latter, 
the Gold Premium Tax of May 1932 introduced a levy of fifteen per cent 
on monthly outputs exceeding three hundred ounces from mines realising 
more than 2% dwts. per ton. Apart from minor adjustments to the level of 
exemption, this tax remained in force until 1937 when it was temporarily
esReport of the Secretary, Department of Mines and Public Works, on Mines for the 
year 1935, 1.
67lncreased Government aid was also related to the Colony’s purchase of the mineral 
rights from the BSAC in 1933; prior to that date, the government was unwilling to 
assist an industry whose royalties went to a private company; see S 480/6, ‘Mining 
Policy’, 23.V.1933.
6eFor details, see Report of the Secretary, Department of Mines and Public Works, on 
Mines, for the year 1936, 3; Rhodesian Mines and Industries, October 1940, 5-9; 
ibid, June 1949, 29-31.
69S 257. A. R. Metelerkamp, to Secretary, Department of Mines and Public Works, 
15.ii.1934. But a number of small mines were so marginal they could not afford the 
initial capital cost of electricity; see Report of the Secretary, Department of Mines 
and Public Works, on Mines, for the year 1938, 7.
7 0 All mines paid income tax.
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abandoned, only to reappear in a somewhat different form in September 
1939.7' While the full consequences of the Government’s taxation policy were 
to emerge only during and after World War Two, it had two immediate 
results.
The exemption limit of three hundred ounces allowed practically every 
small mine to escape the tax and consequently it was borne by a comparatively 
small number of producers, mostly the large mines.72 By far the greatest 
benefit conferred by the increased price of gold was the lowering of the 
grade of ore which could be profitably mined and, as earlier noted, the grade 
declined considerably after 1931. In theory, such a  development should 
have been of immense value to large mines who could thereby lengthen their 
profitable lives by initially mining expanded tonnages of low grade ore, 
while conserving, as in the early 1920s, reserves of high grade ore. But full 
implementation of this policy was frustrated both by the incidence and the 
way in which the Gold Premium Tax worked. Because it was a tax on the 
product itself, it meant that ‘this policy of working low grade ore may not 
be practicable because such a tax by reducing the value of the low grade ore 
automatically excludes the whole or portion thereof from the range of ore 
which can be profitably extracted at all’.73 Nor was the Government itself 
unaware of the effect of the tax; when it was reintroduced in 1939, the 
Minister of Finance specifically rejected the alternative of an excess profits 
tax because ‘producers who were able to reduce their grade would feel 
constrained to do so, and the amount of tax collected would be proportion­
ately reduced’.74 It was therefore only the smaller mines who were able to 
work the lowest grades of gold ore; in 1935 when the average grade extracted 
by the industry as a whole was 3.9 dwts, that of the majority of large mines 
was 6.1 dwts.75
Even as taxation operated to shorten the lives of existing large mines, 
so its second result, that of deterring large-scale capital from entering the 
gold mining industry, reduced the possibilities of developing new properties 
of equivalent importance. The problems associated with declining output 
from the mid-1920s onwards had originally inhibited the flow of capital as 
companies were unwilling to take up fresh ventures. Calls had been made 
for a ‘purely speculative — or more speculative — mining company than 
we have in the country at present’, because most of the ‘companies today 
require more development done before they take up an option than our
7tFor discussion and explanation of this complex taxation, see, Report of the Committee 
of Enquiry into the Taxation of Low Grade Mines, 1937; Report of the Commission of 
Enquiry into the Mining Industry of Southern Rhodesia, 1945. 
tiRhodesia Chamber of Mines Annual Report for the year 1934, 18; Rhodesian Mining 
Journal, June 1932, 314.
73Commission of Enquiry into the Mining Industry, 6.
7iH.Mss. SM 4/1/1, Memorandum, Gold Premium Taxation Act, 23.xi.1939. 
tsRhodesia Chamber of Mines Annual Report for the year 1935, 17.
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prospectors are able to provide’. It was recognised, however, that while ‘we 
had such companies in the early days, . . .  it is quite possible that we have 
passed that phase in the country’s development’.76
One way of overcoming the general inability of prospectors to provide 
sufficient development to entice company interest was to employ the modern 
prospecting methods (i.e. exclusive prospecting grants and aerial surveys 
under the control of the searching company) which had been so successful 
on the the Northern Rhodesian Copperbelt. But this method of attracting 
capital was stopped by smallworkers:
‘[They] turned down a golden opportunity of introducing much 
needed funds for the thorough exploration of a large tract of 
mineralised terrain. It was not as if they were protecting their in­
terests in respect of virgin country in a mining sense; the area in­
volved has been prospected for the past forty years, and the fact 
that no striking results accrued from this cursory investigation only 
points all the more decidedly to the need for a properly-conducted 
mineral survey by trained experts, equipped with the latest instru­
ments and able to bring to the under-taking a wide knowledge of 
mineral occurrences and rock formations on other fields. This un­
conditional slighting of the bona fide offer made by the Victoria 
Prospecting Syndicate, which embraces most of the influential 
mining houses of South Africa, can do the Colony no good, and 
is . . . calculated to make capital shy in the future’.77
Denied the advantages of modem prospecting methods and later ham­
pered by Government taxation, the flow of outside capital declined to 
a trickle. The gold mining industry increasingly came to rely on small amounts 
of capital locally raised by smallworkers and syndicates for development. 
In 1932, the sum of the capital for new flotations was £107,000 and in 1933 
a still-inadequate £360,000.78 Large companies already operating in Southern 
Rhodesia also devoted sums to the search for new mines, but their approach 
was cautious and expenditure restricted owing to the constraints previously 
outlined. Leading companies later disclosed that between 1935 and 1938, 
‘over four hundred properties owned or worked by smallworkers or others 
had been offered to them and examined with a view to the taking of develop­
ment options or purchase. The companies between them took working options 
on twenty-one properties resulting in the purchase of five’.79
‘It is still apparent’, wrote the Secretary for Mines in 1935, ‘that there 
is insufficient capital in the Colony for the successful development of the 
mining industry’.80 Hopes were pinned on signs that a number of South
76S 480/1, Downie to Inskipp, 7.xii,1928.
nRhodesian Mining Journal, December 1931, 696.
7sIbid, January 1935, 10.
tsReport of the Economic Development Committee, 1939, 4.
so Report of the Secretary, Department of Mines and Public Works, on Mines, for the 
year 1935, 3.
COLD MINING IN SOUTHERN RHODESIA, 1919-1933 39
African financial houses were turning their attention to Southern Rhodesia, 
but these evaporated during 1936. ‘Disappointment has followed’, explained 
the Colony’s Minister of Finance, the ‘Government’s taxation policy is likely 
to act as a deterrent to development’.8' Another reason for the failure of the 
gold mining industry to attract much-needed capital was the existence of the 
Loan Fund for small mines. Financial help from this source enabled small- 
workers to develop properties themselves and the resultant degree of independ­
ence allowed them to demand higher prices before selling to companies. 
The consequence of the Fund for the wider development of the industry were 
later reported as
‘(1) . . . promising properties remained in inexperienced hands;
(2) . . . owners are encouraged to overvalue their properties when 
seeking the aid of private capital; (3) . . . the Government and the 
owners are expending public funds on ventures too risky to attract 
capital available for legitimate ventures’.82
Domestic factors aside, perhaps the main reason for the Southern 
Rhodesian gold mining industry’s lack of capital was the perennial problem 
of competition with Rand investment opportunities. The Rhodesian Mining 
Journal was convinced that the ‘present non-availability of Rand capital for 
Rhodesian gold mining projects is that the future new mines . . .  on the 
extension of the industrialised sector of the Rand syncline offer a much 
better prospective return than a low-grade Rhodesian proposition . . . the 
prospect of a deviation of capital to Rhodesian gold mining enterprises . . . 
seems very slight indeed’.83
With expanded production based on its technologically least-advanced 
and least-capitalised sector, the gold mining industry was ill-fitted for the 
outbreak of World War Two and its ensuing problems. As in the last war, 
cost inflation was major problem and one which smallworkers were least 
able to combat. An investigation conducted by the Government revealed 
that after only three months of the war beginning, ‘the rise in cost of labour, 
rations, mining supplies and power over all mines [was] . . . 1.28 per cent 
. . . The increase did not appreciably affect the large mines which had with 
commendable foresight laid in large reserves of supplies but it has already 
embarrassed some of the small workers who have not sufficient working 
capital to plan far ahead’.84 By 1942 the average price level of mining supplies 
had advanced by twenty three per cent in the case of large mines and by 
thirty one per cent for small mines:
•iH.Mss. SM 4/1/1 . Memorandum, undated.
Economic Development Committee, 5. 
esRhodesian Mining Journal. November 1936, 1196.
84Report of the Secretary, Department of Mines and Public Works, on Mines for the 
year 1939, 3.
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‘It is not surprising, therefore, that the shortfall in gold production 
should be mainly due to a reduction in the number of small 
workers . . . fthey] declined from 1,050 in 1941 to 877 in 1942 , . . 
and the gold yield of this class decreased from 183,924 fine ounces in 
1941 to 148,539 in 1942’.88
Throughout the war years the output of gold continued to fall rapidly 
and in 1945 production amounted to 568,242 ounces, a decrease of 258,243 
ounces since 1940.86 The total number of gold mines fell from 1,477 in 1940 
to 732 in 1945, by far the greatest reduction in numbers occurring amongst 
smallworkers.87 Large mines gradually began to recover their former pre­
dominant position within the industry and in 1945 produced over forty six 
per cent of the total gold output. Ten years later their contribution had risen 
to over sixty per cent.88 Unlike the period after World War One, however, 
large producers were unable to maintain their outputs at pre-war figures; 
these declined markedly from approximately 352 thousand ounces in 1940 
to 263 thousand in 1945 and to 231 thousand in 1950.89 Their expanded per­
centage contribution to total production was merely a reflection of the drama­
tic collapse of smallworker production.
Although big mines were more capable of absorbing rising costs during 
the war than were smaller propositions, their general viability continued to 
be eroded to a certain extent by Government taxation policy. Re-imposition 
of the Gold Premium Tax at the beginning of the war was considered to 
be a major burden and in fact was strongly criticised in 1945 by a Commission 
appointed to enquire into the deteriorating state of the gold mining industry.90 
Nor did abolition of the tax at the end of the war alter the prospects of the 
industry; in the short-term capital remained scarce and companies were 
unwilling to undertake expensive operations. The Secretary for Mines pointed 
to the case of The Gold Fields Rhodesian Development Company who
‘exercised its option over the B. & S„ Fossicker and Jupiter Mines 
during the year . . . [but] it seems unlikely . . . that the mines will 
be equipped, or that money will be raised from the investing public, 
until the taxation policy of the new Government is known. There is
B5Chamber of Mines of Rhodesia Annual Report for the year 1942, 10; see also, 
Report of the Secretary, Department of Mines and Public Works, on Mines for the 
year 1942, 14; ‘conditions in 1942 have generally deteriorated and have affected to 
a considerable extent the small worker . . . [but] have not seriously handicapped the 
the operations of the larger mines’.
eeReport of the Secretary, Department of Mines, for the year ended 31st December, 
1945, 64.
67Annual Report of the Chief Government Mining Engineer and Chief Inspector of 
Mines Southern Rhodesia, for the year ending 31st December, 1953, 25.
eeChamber of Mines Journal, April 1962, 25.
eolbid.
BoCommission of Enquiry into the Mining Industry, 5. For Government defence of its 
policy, see Southern Rhodesia Legislative Assembly Debates, 24, Sixth Session, Fifth 
Parliament, l.v.1944, col. 512 onwards.
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the same hesitation for similar reasons on the part of other “entre­
preneurs” who are interested in Rhodesian mines, and no venture­
some capital is likely to be introduced into the Colony for mining 
purposes until the position is more stabilised’.9'
More significant were the long-term consequences of previous Government 
policy and the associated scarcity of capital which had hampered gold 
mining for over a decade.
Because large producers had been frustrated in their desire to work 
the lowest possible grades of gold ore during the optimum economic condi­
tions of the 1930s and because little capital had been forthcoming for the 
development of new big mines, the ability of this sector to maximise output 
after 1945 was limited. Moreover, problems of falling output were greatly 
compounded by cost inflation which remained unbated in the period 1946 to 
1953. Not only did the cost of mining stores rise steadily, but so did African 
wages, both of which formed a major portion of total working costs. Refer­
ence to Table III below indicates the magnitude of cost inflation.
TABLE in : WORKING COST INDEX, 1939-50 2





i o o  !i 137 143.6 152.6 169
African
Wages 100 ? 144.4 160.6 177.4
In particular, the rise in African wages threatened the very foundation 
of the gold mining industry’s profitability. It was earlier explained that cost 
minimisation in this sphere was crucial for smallworkers and the problems 
encountered by large mines in other fields underscored the continuing central 
importance of cheap black labour for their profitable existence. A report 
in 1945 warned that the
‘future of mining in Southern Rhodesia is mainly dependent on the 
continuance of an adequate supply of Native labour, and on its 
efficient use. Without the Native Labourer neither the mining industry 
of Southern Rhodesia nor that of the rest of South Africa could have 
been developed in the past, or can be maintained or expanded in the 
future’.93
BtReport of the Secretary, Department of Mines, for the year ended 31st December, 
1945, 69.
Bi-Southern Rhodesia, Treasury, ‘Economic Survey of Southern Rhodesia, April 1946 
to March 1951’, 27.
BBCommission of Enquiry into the Mining Industry, 12.
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Signs of labour shortage had been apparent as far back as 1936 and in 
response wages had crept slightly upwards.94. Once again, Southern Rho­
desia's situation within the regional economy was an important factor; ‘the 
labour requirements of the mines on the Rand are almost insatiable, and 
there appears a danger that . . .  the higher wages paid by the Rand mines 
will be an irresistible magnet to native labour’. The solution, suggested the 
Secretary for Mines, ‘lies in making conditions of labour as attractive as 
possible and in giving a fair return for services rendered’.93 But substantial 
wage increases were beyond the capacity of much of the gold mining industry.
After 1939, the gold mines faced competition for labour from other 
sources as well; the war acted as a major stimulus both to the labour needs 
of the base mineral properties and to those of rapidly expanding secondary 
industry. Neither form of enterprise was circumscribed by a fixed price for 
its product and consequently could easily out-bid the gold mines in the labour 
market. ‘The [gold] miner can only pay a certain price for his labour’, 
complained one industrial journal, ‘and he canont afford to meet the com­
petition of secondary industry’.93 Despite an increase in average monthly 
cash wages on gold mines of roughly thirty one per cent in the period 1939- 
1947, the level of such wages was progressively falling behind those paid by 
base mineral mines.
TABLE IV: AVERAGE MONTHLY AFRICAN CASH WAGES 
BY MINERAL WON, 1944-1953”
AVERAGE MONTHLY WAGES PER AFRICAN EMPLOYED
Year| Gold Asbestos Chrome Coal Mica Tin l All Minerals
s. d. s. d. s. d. s. d. s. d. s. d. s. d.
1944 26 9 26 4 28 3 48 2 19 8 23 9 28 0
1945 27 5 26 6 30 3 46 10 20 9 24 10 28 9
1946! 28 9 31 0 33 9 48 6 22 6 25 8 30 7
1947 30 4 34 7 36 1 46 2 25 3 27 6 32 4
1948 33 7 36 2 42 9 65 1 27 4 28 6 37 2
1949 37 4 42 4 46 8 67 9 30 2 31 2 42 8
1950 41 1 46 5 49 3 69 7 35 7 35 6 46 2
1951 44 4 40 7 57 2 78 6 37 0 40 10 49 3
1952 49 10 55 4 65 3 77 1 44 9 56 0 57 3
1953 53 2 66 0 67 11 82 8 50 11 62 10 63 5
9^Economic and Statistical Bulletin of Southern Rhodesia, IV (New Series), 21.vh.1938, 
2.
9 5 Report of the Secretary, Department of Mines and Public Works, on Mines, for the 
year 1937, 8.
seRhodesian Mines and Industries, April 1948, 13.
97Annual Report of the Chief Government Mining Engineer and Chief Inspector of 
Mines . . . for the year ending 31st December, 1954, 9.
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This trend became even more marked after 1947; in 1953 only mica mines 
paid lower monthly wages than gold mines.
Renewed competition also came from the Northern Rhodesian copper 
mines where average wages in 1949 were over 21s. per month higher than 
on gold mines in Southern Rhodesia and the latter’s labour supply was 
accordingly reduced.98 Between 1942 and 1952, the African labour supply 
from Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland decreased by almost twenty thousand, 
‘due, no doubt, to the fact that there is more employment now offering in 
their own countries, and at better rates than were previously paid’. The 
gold mining industry was forced to concede that the
‘deciding factor that affects any expansion of the African labour 
force in Southern Rhodesia, and one quite beyond the control of 
those who are endeavouring to obtain increased labour, is the high 
wage scale on the large Northern Rhodesian mines’.
In 1952, wages on the Copperbelt were almost exactly double those pertaining 
on gold mines in the south.95
Apart from causing wages to rise, the shortage of labour further in­
creased working costs because many mines were unable to keep their milling 
plants running at full capacity.100 One solution to the problem lay in 
mechanisation and on some mines underground locomotives and mechanical 
loaders were introduced.101 Only large mines, however, could afford the 
requisite capital outlay:
‘It is not possible to overcome the [labour] problem so far as the 
majority of mines are concerned by reducing the number of Native 
employees and embarking on increased and improved mechanisa­
tion, because such mechanisation involves a large capital outlay, 
and such an outlay is not available or warranted in the majority of 
instances. The smaller mines must have Native labour, and if they 
are to survive, the overall cost of that labour must not be increased 
above present costs’.102
esRhodesian Mining Journal, April 1950, 95.
9 9  Ibid, January 1953, 3. This factor had a direct bearing on the composition of 
Federal Government responsibilities when the Central African Federation was 
established at the end of 1953; according to Colin Leys, European Politics in South­
ern Rhodesia (Oxford, 1959), 104; ‘Mining was not left as a Territorial Government 
responsibility by accident. Although the principal argument in favour of federation was 
the possibility of co-ordinating economic development under a single government, 
mining, the lynch-pin of the economy, was not transferred to the Federal Government 
because the Southern Rhodesian mines feared the phenomenally high wages and the 
dominating economic strength of the copperbelt. Probably they have been able to 
perpetuate in this way a level of wages and working conditions more favourable to 
to them than if they had had to deal, in company with the copperbelt, with a Federal 
minister’.
mo Chamber of Mines of Rhodesia Annual Report for the year 1948, 2. 
iciRhodesian Mining Review, July 1952, 17. The productivity of African labour on gold 
mines also increased; see Rhodesian Mining Journal, January 1949, 27-9. For mecha­
nisation on Wankie Colliery, see Rhodesian Mining Journal, February 1949, 55. 
wzReport of the National Native Labour Board . . . , 6.xi.l948, 30.
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Although unable to undertake extensive mechanisation, small mines attempted 
to minimise increased African labour costs by paying closer attention to 
efficient and standardised mine ‘lay-outs’, together with a limited degree of 
mechanisation.103 Whereas mining magazines had formerly carried articles 
reiterating the customary day-to-day economies necessary on smallworkings,'04 
these were now superseded by advice concerning the advantages of limited 
mechanisation and the small capital cost involved.’05
Some assistance came from the Government in the form of a temporary 
subsidy on the price of gold and the devaluation of Sterling in 1949, but 
constantly increasing costs soon narrowed the profit margin in relation to the 
fixed dollar price of gold. ‘It is extremely unlikely’, reported the President 
of the Chamber of Mines, ‘that much more capital will be put into gold 
mining unless there is a radical change in the general cost structure and/or 
in the price of the metal’.106 But the only changes in the cost structure were 
upwards; the cost index for mine stores rose from 169.0 in 1950 to 205.2 in 
1953 and by the latter year, average monthly African wages had risen by 
over twenty five shillings since 1944. Further price increases were threatened 
in railway rates and in the cost of electrical power.107
In 1953 the amount of gold produced, although having recovered slightly 
from 1948, was smaller than in 1906 and it was acknowledged that the ‘day 
of the “Small-worker”, to whom this country is so deeply indebted, is rapidly 
drawing to a close’. For the gold mining industry as a whole, there seemed 
only the dismal prospect of progressively difficult conditions without any 
immediate likelihood ‘of an increase in the price of gold to assist mines to 
hang on in hope of better times’.108
ivzRhodesian Mining Review, December 1949, 11.
1 0 4 ‘Natives are notoriously extravagant with grease and oils, and their usual practice 
is to dig into a tin of grease, take out about a pound and put it on a flat tin. Then 
they grease a scotch cart or cocopan using about a tenth of the grease and forget 
about the rest. If each native that does greasing regularly has his own tin and the 
grease is issued from the store, a lot of waste can be prevented; Smallworker, August 
1946, 9.
'osRhodesian Mining Review, January 1952, 20-1.
<0 6 Chamber of Mines Annual Report for the year 1953, 3.
>07Annual Report of the Chief Government Mining Engineer for the year ending 31st 
December, 1953, 13, 5, 17.
io slbid, 13, 19.
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